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JURISDICTIONAL STflTEflEHT
The Court of Rppeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Rule
26(2)(a) of Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; Sections 771-6(g) and 78-2a-3(2)(k) Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
anended; and Rule 3(a) Utah Rules of Rppellate Procedure.
This Rppeal has been referred to the Court of Rppeals by
the Utah Supreme Court.

I*.

STRTEHEHT QF ISSUES
1.

Did the trial court err

In not dismissing for

cause a juror whose brother Is a local Ian enforcement
officer and who had worked previously vith one of the key
prosecution

fitnesses?

Abuse of

discretion

standard.

Article 1, Section 12, Utah Constitution; Sixth Amendment,
United States Constitution; Rule 18, Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure.

State u. Cox. 826 P.2d 656 (Utah App. 1992);

State v. Uoolleu. 610 P.2d 440 (Utah Rpp.) cart denhd}

826

P.2d 651 (Utah 1991).
2.

Did the trial court err

in admitting evidence of

defendant's prior criminal history and other bad acts?
Standard of review

is abuse of discretion.

Hamilton. 827 P.2d 232 (Utah 1992).

State v.

Rules 403, 404, 609,

Utah Rules of Evidence.
3. Did the state produce sufficient evidence to
support the verdict of the Jury? Evidence Is reviewed In
light most favorable to jury verdict and conviction mill be
reversed if evidence in support of appellant is such that
reasonable minds mould have a reasonable doubt as to the
outcome. State v. Jonas. 793 P.2d 902 (Utah App. 1990).
DETERI1IHRT1UE CONSTITUTIONAL PROUiSIONS. STATUTES. RULES
Texts set forth in the addendum.
For location in brief, please see table of contents.

I

STflTEflEHT QF CRSE
fl. Nature of the Case
Oefendant Charles Edge nas charged by information with
distribution of a controlled substance

in violation of

Section 58-37-8(1)(a) U.C.fl (Supp, 1992), In the Ssventh
District Court, for acts allegedly occurring on November
16, 1991. (Record 2-3).

The transaction nas alleged to

have occurred •I thin 1,000 feet of a school and the charge
was enhanced to a first degree felony,

Also charged lere

Shannon Taylor and Kit Burke, whose cases were handled
separately.
6.

Course of Proceedings

On September 21, 1992, a Jury trial

mas held

in

Seventh District Court tlth the Honorable Boyd Bunnell
presiding.

Prior to trial, Oefendant filed a motion in

limine (and supporting memorandum) to exclude testimony
concerning his prior criminal history. (R. 29-30, 33-36).
The State did not file a response to defendant's motion.
Rt trial, Judge Bunnell denied the notion and admitted the
evidence.

(Transcript

at

176-78).

During

his

cross-

examination Defendant mas questioned about his prior felony
convictions

for receiving

stolen property, arson,

and

burglary, and his misdemeanor conviction for possession of
drug paraphernalia.

(T. 179*80).

He mas also questioned

about a subsequent incident allegedly Involving drug use,
which

he denied.

(T.

183-84,

186-87,

189).

Officer

Richmond testified
act, (T.

in rebuttal

about the subsequent

bad

190-91).

During voir dire, one of the potential jurors stated
that his brother ias a Grand County officer.

(T. 27). He

mas questioned briefly about his ability to judge the case.
(T. 27-28).

He also

expressed

prior knowledge

of

the

informant and again was questioned superficially about the
impact on his impartiality.

(T. 42). His challenge

for

cause by the defendant was denied (T. 47) and defense did
not use a peremptory challenge to strike him and he mas
seated as a juror.
was the fact

One of the reasons the court relied on

that his brother was not

present case. (T. 47).

involved

in the

Homever, during the trial, his

brother (officer) was present in the courtroom and assisted
the prosecution.

(Rn objection to his presence

mas made

at an unrecorded sidebar and he left the courtroom.) (T.
106).
C.

Disposition at Trial Court

Defendant MOB found guilty as charged by the jury.
(R, 89). On October 21, 1992 defendant ias sentenced and
committed to the Utah State Prison for a term of five years
to life. (R. 102-5).
D.

Facts

On November
convenience store

16, 1991 Defendant was at the Haverick
in floab, Grand County, Utah with two

other individuals, co-defendants, Shannon Taylor and Kim
Burke. For a few days prior and earlier the same day, Ms.

Burke was in contact with the confidential informant, Danny
Nickle, arranging to sell him nethamphetamine. (T. 73-76,
60). tin. Nlckle was supervised by Ron Richmond vho worked
for the Grand County Sheriff's Department and the Four
Corners Narcotics Strike Force. (T. 74, 145). Approximately
an hour before the transaction In question, Us. Taylor and
Hs. Burke, met with the confidential

informant vho was

clerking at the store, picked up the money for the drugs,
and scheduled the delivery.

(T. 83-87).

Rithough, the

prior arrangements iere made by lis. Burke, Ms. Taylor
appeared to be in charge at this point. (T. 66) Ms. Taylor
stated that she had to cut the drugs herself (T. 123, 132)
and that "(l)f you don't narc me, you've got a dealer." (T.
121, 132). Though the confidential

Informant's testimony

varied during the preliminary hearing on this point, at
trial

he was adamant

that

he

saw Mr. Edge

put

methamphetamlne bindle on the counter. (T. 91, 101).

the
He

also testified that Ms. Burke then picked up the bindle and
handed It to him, Hickle. (T. 125). The police officer mas
unable to see the transaction. (T. 155).
The

incident

was

recorded

and

fir. Edge

made

a

statement to Hickle that he didn't want to see him across a
courtroom. (T. 93).

Defendant explained he mas at the

store to get cigarettes and not involved in any drug deal.
(T. 172, 175). He also explained the courtroom comment vas
due to concern about the Informant being a "narc" and fear
of being set up as he was on parole at the time. (T. 174).
4

The testimony of both the officer and Informant varied
on

seueral

substantial

events throughout

the

day

in

question. One such point Is the "false start" there the
informant was mired for a drug deal that did not happen.
(T. 00). The officer did not remember this or include It
In his report.

(T. 162-63). The Informant noted In his

report (Exhibit 4) that he mas given money at the earlier
time, but denied it at trial.

(T. 110, 129)

was done on the same day as the transaction.

The report

(T. 102).

Hickle also denied that the first mention of buying a
gram of methamphetamine mas when Richmond told him to try
to buy a gram.

(T, 116, 129), He testified that mhen he

talked with Ms. Burke, flue minutes before talking tilth
Richmond, she mentioned a gram (T. 116) but that he didn't
tell Richmond that he could get a gram because he didn't
pay any attention to her saying a gram when ehe said It.
(T, 117, 129).

This later recollection

conflict with his report.

is in direct

(117, 129, Exhibit 4 ) .

SUnnflRY DF flRCUHEHTS
1. The trial court erred In not dismissing for cause
the juror mho mas the brother of a local lam enforcement
officer and mho had previous contact mlth the confidential
Informant,
2.

The trial court erred In admitting evidence of

defendant's prior criminal history,

5

The trial court also

erred In admitting evidence of other subsequent bad acts of
the defendant.
3. The state did not present sufficient evidence to
support the verdict of the Jury,

RRGUMEHT
1.

Jury Selection
The trial judge abused his discretion

In falling to

excuse Juror flcGann for cause after he

indicated

his

relationship to a local Idi enforcement officer and his
knowledge of the confidential Informant. The trial court's
minimal investigation and questioning mas insufficient to
rebut the Inference of bias.
fl motion to dism 188 a prospective juror for cause Is
within the sound discretion of the trial court.

State v.

Uoolleu. 810 P.2d 440,442 (Utah App.) c*M> denied, 826 P.2d
651 (Utah 1991); State v. Got fl chalL7B2 P.2d 459, 462 (Utah
1989).

However, "(l)t is prejudicial error to compel a

party to exercise a peremptory challenge to remove a Jury
panel member who should have been removed

for cause."

State v. Cox. 826 P.2d 656, 659 (Utah Rpp. 1992).
Utah Appellate Courts have consistently

emphasized

that "It Is the (trial Judge's) duty to see that the
constitutional right of an accused to an impartial jury Is
safeguarded," and have reversed criminal convictions solely
on

the

appearance

that
6

such

right

may

have

been

jeopardized,

Uoollsu. 810 P.2d at 442 quoting State v.

Dixon.560 P,2d 318, 319-20 (Utah 1977).
That right Is guaranteed under Article I, Section 12
of the Utah Constitution and the Sixth Riendnent to the
United States Constitution Is codified in Utah Rule of
Criminal Procedure 18(e) tihlch statss iihsn a Juror should
be removed for cause. The pertinent grounds for Juror
HcGann's renewal are\
(4) the existence of any social, legal,
business, fiduciary or other relationship betieen
the prospective Juror and any party, (fitness or
person alleged to have been victimized or Injured
by the defendant, which relationship when viewed
objectively, would suggest to reasonable ninds
that the prospective juror would be unable or
unwilling to return a verdict which would be free
of favoritism. . . .
(14) that a state of wind exists on the part of
the Juror with rsference to the cause, or to
either party, which will prevent hit from acting
(•partially and without prejudice to the
substantial rights of the party challenging. . . .
Utah R. Crln. P. 18(e)(4) and (14).
The Issue of juror bias was raised during the court's
voir dire Inquiry of Juror HcGann relative to his deputy
sheriff brother:
THE COURT: . . . Any of you had that experience
In your background, where you've worked or
members of your family have worked for a police
department? Let's see, Mr. flagann?

7

hR, HRGflNN ( s i c ) } Hagann, Veah. fly b r o t h e r ' s a
deputy s h e r i f f ,
THE COURTs find here In Grand County?
HR I1RGRHN: Ves.

THE COURT: Does he talk about his work tilth you
all the tine?
I1R, flRGRHN:

Mot very o f t e n .

THE COURT: Not very often, huh? I wean, some
guys are mouthy are It and sons aren't. So, do
you think—lot's sss, he Is not listed as a
witness here, but do you think the fact that he
works for the sheriff's department, would that
influence the way you would look at the evidence
In this case?
HR. I1RGRNN: Ho. I don't think so.
THE COURT: Uould you glue more weight to a
police officer than you would Just anybody else,
because of your brother's association there? Or
do you think if a police officer testified, you'd
give it the fair weight you think It's entitled
to receive?
m, HRGRNN: That's hard t o —
THE COURT: Hell, we Just have to have your best
Judgwent on it, as to whether or not—In other
words, the fact that a police officer, Is that
fact going to make you give hln wore credibility
or less credibility just because he's a police
officer? That's, of courss, always the question
we have to ask.
HR. tlRGRHH: I think It-It would be the sawe.
THE COURT: It would be the sane? Vou don't
think that fact that your brother's In that
profession wouldn't (lake any difference relative
to the way you'd look at the evidence here?
MR. I1RGRNH: No. I don't think so.
THE COURT: I see. RlI right. Rnyone else now?
(T. 27-28). (Note, the transcript spelling of NcGann's
name Is incorrect).
8

Impartiality was also raised when NcGann stated that
he knew the confidential Infornant and was questioned as
follows:
THE COURT; Anyone else on any of these fitnesses
now that we've talked about? Let's s e e —
riR, MRGRNH: Janes Magann,
THE COURT; fir, Magann?
MR, MRGRMH: I know Danny Hlckle froi the fire
department,
THE COURT; Is that the I lilt of your association
with him?
MR. ilRGRNN: Ves.
THE COURT; Anything In what you know about nil
that would make you want to glue wore or less
weight to his testimony than you would anybody
else, or Just what you think It's fairly entitled
to receive?
OR, MRGRNN: Frow what I've heard frou-frou
Danny, that—
THE COURT: Hell, don't tell us what that Is or
anything else, nor whether It would be nore or
MR. MRGRNH: No, I know, but I--I think I could
be—listen objectively.
THE COURT: Veah. Uhen you say heard fron hi*,
you didn't talk about this case, did you, with
hln?
MR. MRGRNH: Ho. This was years ago.
THE COURT: Oh. Vears ago. I see.
So, there wasn't anything about this case that
you talked—
MR. MRGRHN: No.
THE COURT: —talked to hln about? Okay.
(T. 41-42).

9

Once such a bias is raised, the court must fully
investigate the relationship.

The "exploration should not

be merely pro forma." Uoolleg. 810 P.2d at 445. The court
cannot just rely on a "subsequent general statement by the
juror that he or she can be fair and impartial" as was done
in this case.

Id,

On both issues the trial court

interrupted juror tlcGann fild-explanatIon; specifically, on
the officer questioning, when he started to answer "That's
hard t o — " (T. 28) and on the Hlckle questioning then he
said "from what he'd heard from Danny— M (T. 42). Neither
one of these equivocal statements mere pursued by the
judge, who relied on further less than emphatic answers.
(For further review of voir dire bias investigation, please
see Uoolleu 810 P.2d 445-48).
The lack of sufficient questioning Is of extra concern
in the present case which Involves double potential bias.
In a similar case, the Utah Court of Appeals found that the
court's failure to remove a Juror (RustIn) whose brotherin-law uas police chief and who had a recent
client relationship
error.

attorney-

with the prosecutor was reversible

The Court held that "(t)he cumulative effect of

Austin having two possibly prejudicial

rslationships is

especially troubling given 'that It Is a simple matter to
obviate

any

problem

of bias

simply

by

excusing

the

prospective Juror and selecting another. 1 " Cox. 826 P.2d at
661, quoting Uoolley. 810 P.2d at 442.

10

The wisdom of this

simple solution was echoed by the Tenth Circuit who held
thus Iy because they:
have no psychic calipers with which to measure
the purity of the prospective Juror; rather, our
mundane experience nust guide us to the Impartial
jury promised by the Sixth Amendment, Doubts
about the existence of actual bias should be
resolved against permitting the Juror to serve,
unless the prospective panelist's protsstatlon of
a purge of preconception Is positive, not pallid.
Burton v. Johnson.948 F.2d 1150, 1158 (10th Clr. 1991).
That course (dismissal of flcGann for cause) should
have been followed In the present case and the trial Judge
abused his discretion by not doing so,
2.

Admission of Criminal History
A.

The trial court committed reversible error In

admitting evidence of defendant's prior felony convictions,
without requiring prosecution to neet Its burden of proof
and without the necessary weighing process,
Rdmlsslon of said evidence is governed by Rule 609,
Utah Rules of Evidence.

The overriding Issue Is whether

the probative value of the convictions outweighs their
prejudicial effect.

The admission of such evidence should

be carefully balanced due to:
tendency of a fact finder to convict the accused
because of bad character rather than because he
is shown to be guilty of the offenses charged.
Because of this tendency, such evidence Is
11

presumed prejudicial and, absent a reason for the
adn1881 on of the evidence other than to show
criminal disposition, the evidence Is excluded.
StflU y, Saunders, 699 P.2d 738 at 711 (Utah 1985). The
trial court noted that potential prejudicial impact In Its
decision:
, . . ordinarily, . . . the evidence of other
crimes Is not admissible because of Its
prejudicial effect, where a Jury might be
inclined to—-to convict Just on the fact that
he's — o r make—might make the determination
that he's a bad—bad person or has bad
character.
(T. 177). Despite the inherent problems with admitting
such evidence, which the court acknowledged, he allowed the
use of the prior convictions because;
And as to credibility on the felony convictions,
again, In cases of where the credibility is a
key Issue, and that's what we have In this
case, although we do have some other somewhat
corroborating evidence by way of Mr. Richmond
and the Informant, credibility Is a key Issue
here; so, because of that, the Court's going to
allow the questions and the—see what his answer
Is to those, for those reasons.
(T. 176). The prosecution offered no rationale for the use
of the convictions, he merely stated his Intent to use
them. (T. 176-77). He stated no rule allowing for the
admission of the convictions and offered no evidence that
introduction of the convictions was more probative than
prejudicial.

"It Is universally held that the prosecution
12

under Rule 609(a)(1) has the burden of persuading the court
that the probative ualue of admitting the convictions, as
far as shedding

light

on the Defendant's credibility,

outweighs the prejudicial effect to the Defendant."
v. Banner. 717 P.2d 1325 at 1332 (Utah 1986).

State

Even though

the prosecution did nothing to meet that burden the Court,
sua sponte, determined that the convictions should be used
to help the jury determine defendant's credibility.

The

Court did not Indicate on which rule of evidence he based
his decision and did not make any findings, specifically he
did not find that their probative value outuelghed the
prejudicial Impact on the jury.
Rs the Judge noted, the case mas not very strong, he
characterized

the prosecution case as having "someiihat

corroborating evidence" and stated that credibility lias the
key issue.

In a circumstantial case, the court should

consider the importance of the accused's testimony, as
perhaps warranting the exclusion of convictions probative
of the accused's character for veracity.
at 1332 quoting 32B flm. Jur. 2d fetfara/
§ 120 (1982),

Banner. 717 P.2d

fftt/es

of

Evidence

in such a case, the evidence of prior

convictions Is more likely to be prejudicial and harmful.
The underlying motive for the state to admit such
convictions mould be to shoi that the defendant Is a bad
person and should not be believed,
they mere used at trial.

That Is exactly horn

The prosecutor argued in effect

that defendant should not be believed because
13

"He's a

convicted felony." (etc.) (T, 213)

They were also used to

show criminal disposition as prohibited

In Saunders. In

effect arguing to the Jury that defendant Is a criminal so
he must have c o m itted the crlne at issue.
In the present case, the I•permissible analysis mas
urged, as stated above, by the prosecutor's argument that
defendant is a convicted felon , "He's someone mho is in
trouble, he's trying to get out.

Ulll someone under those

circumstances not tell you the truth In order to try and
get out of trouble". (T. 214). This comment clearly urged
the Jury to view Edge as a person mho commits crimes and to
U9e this characteristic as evidence that he distributed
methamphetamine. This is especially prejudicial in a less
than strong case.

"In close cases, the substantive use of

a prior conviction can often tilt the balance In favor of
convictions, particularly

In instant case, where . , .

character Is at the heart of his defense." State v. Emmett
839 P.2d 781, 184 Utah fldv. Rep. 34 at 36 (Utah 1992).
The weighing of prejudicial and probative value is
also found under Rule 403, which provides that "Although
relevant, evidence may be excluded If Its probative value
is substantially

outweighed

by the

danger

of

unfair

prejudice, confusion of the Issued, or misleading the Jury,
or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence."
Evld. 403.

Utah R.

The rationale of Rule 403 further points out
14

the error in admitting the prior convict Ions, which even
assuming relevancy are Impermissibly prejudicial. Factors
to be considered in making that determination Include
the strength of the evidence as to the commission
of the other crime, the similarities between
the crimes, the Interval of time that has elapsed
between the crimes, the need for the evidence,
the efficacy of alternative proof, and the degree
to which the evidence probably •III rouse the Jury
to overmastering hostility.
State v. Schicklea. 760 P.2d 291 at 296 (Utah 1988). Under
the above analysis, the convictions should not have been
a 11 owed{ while there Is no question about the convictions,
there are no similarities between them and the present
charge, the stolen property conviction was three years old
and

the arson and burglary were six years

old,

the

accused's testimony and the Importance of credibility in
this case were critical because of evidentiary problems in
the case, and the charges of arson, burglary and possession
of stolen property were euch that they caused the Jury to
be unable to impartially look at the evidence.
Said
admission was an abuse of discretion and clearly harmful to
the defendant. Under Rule 609 and 403, the convictions
should not have been admitted.
D. The trial court erred in admitting evidence
of defendant's prior drug paraphernalia conviction.
The pertinent rule is Rule 404(b) as the conviction Is
a misdemeanor not involving dishonesty or false statement

15

and therefore Rule 609 in not applicable.

Rule 404(b) Utah

Rules of Evidence states:
Evidence of other crimes, irongs or acts Is
not admissible to prove the character of a
person In order to show that he acted In
conformity therewith, It lay, however, be
admissible for other purposes, such as proof
of motive, opportunity, Intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, Identity, or absence of
mistake or accident.
The Judge seems to have used the Rule 404(b) analysis in
allowing In the misdemeanor conviction.

(T. 177-78).

The

court's rationale for admitting that conviction Is as
folIons;
Then of course, the exception to that Is in
cases of where It's the sane type of an offense,
like the drug paraphernal I a,they're usually
admissible to show that there Is—that Is —
that there wasn't a •Istaks,Intent,where the
testimony that he and the other primary witness
ore absolutely contrary to each other, to show
the absence of mistake or accident, the fact of
Intent, that Is, he would have knowledge of drugs
If it was around, the fact that he's had some
prior association with them.
(T. 177-78).

Rs stated supra, that analysis Is an abuse of

discretion because there was no requisite offer by the
prosecution as to any basis for seeking the adilsslon of
the paraphernalia conviction.

The state clearly did not

indicate that admission was sought to show absence of

16

mistake or Intent,

Also as noted supra, the prosecution

U9ed this conviction to shon bad character.
Even

if the conviction fas adiissible under Rule

404(b) it «ould still have to be admissible under Rule 403
(supra). The prejudicial Inpact of related convictions Is
very high,

It Is often difficult for Jurors to separate or

distinguish between

two

controlled substances.

different

Instances

involving

It Is very likely that the Jury

decided that since the defendant had been convicted of
possession of drug paraphernal la, he euet be guilty of
distribution of drugs.
This conviction falls within the Uniting language of
403.

The conviction unfairly prejudiced the defendant

because it invoked the instinct of the jury to punish
and/or caused thee to base their decision on something
other than the facts of the caee.

Terry v. Zlons C O O P .

Mercantile Inst.. 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979).

Based on the

nature of the present charge, It is very probable that the
admission of this conviction, caused the jury to render
their decision based on the conviction rather than the
evidence presented.
The standard of revlee for the admission of all the
prior convictions Is abuse of discretion.

R reversal of

conviction for Improper Iy admitted evidence
when there is a "reasonable
affected

the outcone

likelihood that

of the proceedings."

Hani I ton. 827 P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 1992).
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Is required
the error
State

v.

Rs stated, supra,

based on the nature of the charge and the convictions and
the evidence presented, there It Is none likely than not
that

admitting

the

convictions

affected

the

jury's

decision.
C.

The Court committed plain error In allowing

testimony on bad acts.
The court allowed the officer to testify in rebuttal
on the extrinsic issue of later drug use, after a denial by
defendant,

Based on rules 404(b) and 403, see discussion

supra, it mas plain error and clearly harmful to alloi such
prejudicial testimony, especially to shorn that defendant
was a bad person.
The standard of rev lei for the bad act testimony is
plain error because no objection mas made at trial.

State

v. Emmett. 839 P.2d 781, 184 Utah fldv. Rep. 34 at 35 (Utah
1992).

"Plain error is error that Is both harmful and

obvious."

id,

Rlloiing the officer to testify about

subsequent

drug

use

allotted

the

jury

to

make

the

impermissible assumption that defendant mas a bad person
and therefore must have committed the

crime charged.

The

probative value mas clearly outmelghed by the danger of
unfair prejudice.

3.

Insufficient evidence.

There mas insufficient evidence to support the jury's
verdict.
18

fi review of

the

facts,

supra,

ehoi

substantial

questions as to the credibility of the chief witness, which
was noted by the trial Judge, supra.
The significant
differences between the officer and the informant, the
memory problems of the Informant and Inconsistencies In his
testimony shot that the evidence is Insufficient and
inconclusive. Rlso, the prosecution scenario Is Inherently
improbable, given the defendant's lack of Involvemsnt in
any of the precedent transactions, (Is. Taylor's comments on
being a dealer and cutting the drugs, and the defendant's
desire to not be involved In drugs due to his parole status
all support defendant's claim that reasonable minds must
had reasonable doubts.
The standard for review of such a claim Is as follows:
In dealing with a claim of insufficiency of
the evidence, "(T)he evidence and the reasonable
Inferences which might be drawn therefrom must be
viewed In the light most favorable to the jury
verdict. R Jury conviction Is reversed for
insufficient evidence only when the evidence, so
viewed, Is sufficiently Inconclusive or
Inherently improbable that reasonable minds must
have entertained a reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed the crime of which he was
convicted."
State v. Johnson. 771 P.2d 1111, 1117

(Utah 1989) accord

State v. Jonas. 793 P.2d 902, 905 (Utah Rpp. 1990).
this standard the conviction ehould
Inconclusive evidence.

19

be

reversed

Under
for

The above discussed errors of the trial court

and the

insufficient evidence deprived the defendant of his right
to due process and a fair trial. Especially then looked at
as a whole, It is clear that defendant's conviction should
be reversed. He tas denied his right to an Impartlal jury
and evidence uas improperly adnltted, he fas thue denied
his right to fair trial. The conviction should be reversed
and the case should be renanded for a ne« trial,
Respectfully submitted this 2^£_

day of April, 1993.

Sandra U, Star ley
Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF DELIUERV
I do hereby certify that on the _ 2 J _ day of April,
1993, I mailed postage prepaid four true and accurate
copies of the the foregoing brief of appellant to:
Utah Attorney General
Rppellate Division
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 8 4 1 H
^%H4AA

-S-.

Attorney for Defendant
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AlfflEHMIM
Rule 609. Impeachment by evidence of conviction of crime.
(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a
witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if
elicited from him or established by public record during cross-examination
but only if the crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess
of one year under the law under which he was convicted, and the court
determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its
prejudicial effect to the defendant....
Rule 26(2)(a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
(2) An appeal may be taken by the defendant from:
(a) the final judgment of conviction, whether by verdict or plea.
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
Rule 3. Appeal as of right: how taken.
(a) Filing appeal form final orders and judgments. An appeal may
be taken from a district, juvenile, or circuit court to the appellate court with
jurisdiction over the appeal from all final orders and judgments, except as
otherwise provided by law, by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the
trial court within the time allowed by Rule 4. Failure of an appellant to take
any step other than the timely filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the
validity of the appeal, but is ground only for such action as the appellate
court deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal or other
sanctions short of dismissal, as well as the award of attorney fees.
Utah Code Annotated, Section 77-1-6. Rights of defendant.
(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled:
(g) To the right of appeal in all cases.

a

Utah Code Annotated. Section 78-2a-3(2)(k)
Court of Appeals jurisdiction
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(k) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme
Court.
Utah Constitution. Article 1. Section 12
(Rights of accused persons.)
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right ... to have
a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which
the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all
cases.
United States Constitution. Amendment VI
(Rights of accused.)
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed
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